Competitive political elites frequently o¤er con ‡icting, irreconcilable accounts of policy-relevant information. This presents a problem for members of the public who lack the skill, time, and attention to become experts on every complicated policy question that might arise. To analyze problems like these, this article presents a formal theory of political communication with competitive senders who have privately known preferences. In equilibrium, senders can jam messages from their opponents; that is, they can send messages designed to leave receivers uncertain about who has sent a truthful message. The article identi…es di¤er-ences between jamming and existing theories, reports empirical predictions, and discusses substantive implications for the politics of representation, the judiciary, and expertise.
Clashing viewpoints are ubiquitous in democratic politics. Voters are bombarded by competing, sometimes con ‡icting messages from candidates during elections; legislators are lobbied by multiple interests on important bills; courts hear arguments from both sides and issue con ‡icting opinions; and regulators receive comments for and against proposed rules.
But competition is not the only quality common to democracies. Democratic politics is also beset by uncertainty about the motives of political actors. Whether politicians intend to poach from the public purse, limit civil liberties, concentrate wealth among a few, and so forth is unclear to voters. Citizens cannot easily distinguish honest politicians from scoundrels by their manner of dress, speaking, education, prior occupation, or other characteristics. There is no screening process that allows only honest politicians to take the stage. Many argue that competition resolves this con ‡ict. But might not competition merely muddy the waters, leaving citizens as confused as ever?
For example, as in debates on most complicated political issues, con ‡icting evidentiary claims dominate the politics of climate change and carbon policy. 2 Environmental activists claim that climate change is caused by human behavior, while skeptics maintain that this claim is not grounded in scienti…c fact. Both sides boast that scienti…c experts are on their side. Pollster Frank Luntz propounded this communications strategy in an infamous 2002 memo: "Voters believe that there is no consensus about global warming within the scienti…c community. Should the public come to believe the scienti…c issues are settled, their views about global warming will change accordingly. ... The scienti…c debate is closing (against us) but [is] not yet closed. There is still a window of opportunity to challenge the science.
You [the skeptic] need to be even more active in recruiting experts who are sympathetic to your view, and much more active in making them part of your message" (Luntz Research Companies, 2001 ; emphasis in original).
It is di¢ cult to know exactly why skeptics like Luntz take the position they do. Is it because they believe that the weight of scienti…c evidence gives good reason to doubt that humans can and do cause climate change, or because, regardless of the evidence, they believe that the costs of policies like cap-and-trade outweigh the bene…ts? On any complicated and controversial issue, non-expert citizens, including almost all of the public, face a challenge in discerning fact from …ction.
Uncertainty about motivations, and especially policy preferences, lies at the root of this problem. To see why, suppose (for the sake of argument) that climate change is a threat recognized privately by both activists and skeptics, but that the two disagree about the circumstances under which a program like cap-and-trade should be implemented. Policy preferences might concern the tradeo¤ between climate change mitigation and economic loss due to the program. The activist prefers to implement the program even if economic losses far outstrip the bene…ts of climate change reduction, although there is a point at which he 3 would abandon the program. Similarly, the skeptic prefers not to implement the program even if this cost-bene…t ratio is low, but there is a point at which the ratio is so low that he would embrace the program. Each point is the private information of that elite.
The elite whose side is aided by a piece of evidence can bene…t from credibly revealing this information (if possible). Less clear is whether the opposing actor prefers to con…rm this message. As an extreme counterfactual, suppose that reliable, yet dense and di¢ cult to understand analysis yielded the prediction that sea levels will rise 100 feet within a decade due to human causes but that, with severe changes in policy, this disaster can be averted.
It is reasonable to conjecture that, in this case, most skeptics would argue in favor of such a policy change. But what messages would these skeptics send if sea levels were predicted to rise 25 feet, 5 feet, 6 inches, or 1 1 2 inches over the same amount of time? How does this uncertainty about preferences a¤ect the credibility of messages from activists? How would members of the public update their beliefs given these messages?
Many features of this environment are captured by a sender-receiver game, in which the elites are senders and a key member of the public is a receiver. But existing theories cannot address the above questions because they fail to consider either competitive senders or uncertainty about preferences. Although many works consider one or the other, none consider both simultaneously. Table 1 illustrates this pattern. To …ll this gap, this article develops a new two-sender cheap talk game. In the game, there is uncertainty about the senders'preferences over the outcome of a policy process. This process is a¤ected both by some feature of the world that only the senders see perfectly (e.g., the extent of humandriven change in sea levels) and an action taken by the receiver (e.g., forming an opinion about cap-and-trade legislation).
In equilibrium, one sender can tell a lie to prevent the receiver from learning information the other sender would like to reveal. I call this phenomenon jamming. For jamming to occur, the receiver must be uncertain who has lied and who has told the truth. To ensure this, it must that, if a jamming message were actually true, the other sender might want to jam it and could do so using the truthful statement the current lie is intended to jam. Faced with jamming messages, the receiver cannot tell who has told the truth and who has lied. If allowed to say so, either sender could credibly claim that the other is lying. Single Sender Crawford and Sobel (1982) Sobel (1985) Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) Austen-Smith (1995) many others Lupia and McCubbins (1998) Morris (2001) Multiple Senders Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) This article Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) Austen-Smith (1993) Krishna and Morgan (2001a,b) Battaglini (2002, 2004) Jamming messages di¤er from the separating and pooling phenomena familiar from existing formal models (e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989) . In a separating equilibrium, the receiver observes identical messages from both senders and learns the underlying information perfectly. In pooling, both senders o¤er vague messages that prevent precise information from being revealed, and the receiver learns nothing precise about the underlying information. Jamming is di¤erent. As in separating equilbria, jamming messages are responsive to changes in underlying information, although they leave the receiver uncertain as to which of the two senders has been truthful. As in pooling equilibria, jamming messages prevent the receiver from becoming fully informed, although they do so by o¤ering precisely counterprogrammed alternatives. Moreover, jamming messages di¤er from both other kinds because they directly contradict each other.
The Model and an Example
Consider a simpli…ed model of elite discourse, in which two opposing elites are aware of some piece of policy-relevant information that is di¢ cult to convey to the mass public. The elites also privately know whether they want to reveal this information to the public, given the potential political impact of rendering it uncontroversial. Both sides craft messages for consumption by a representative member of the public who draws what information she can from the messages and updates her opinion about the policy at hand. Of particular interest is how elites craft these messages and how the public responds.
To put more structure on this idea, label the elites as senders 1 and 2, and the member of the public as the receiver. Policy-relevant evidence is represented by w, the realization of a random variable that Nature randomly chooses according to F w , an atomless, strictly increasing distribution with support on the interval [0; 1]. Each sender i 2 f1; 2g observes w and sends a message m i 2 [0; 1] to the receiver. Messages are simultaneous and have no direct e¤ect on the payo¤s. Upon receipt of messages m 1 and m 2 , the receiver updates her beliefs about w and forms an opinion y 2 [0; 1] about which policy is best.
To determine how beliefs and opinions depend on messages, we need assumptions about the relationship between policies and outcomes, and about preferences. The …rst assumption is familiar from many incomplete information models of politics.
Linear Outcomes Given w and y, the outcome x = w y:
4
Each player has single-peaked preferences and a unique most-preferred outcome, or type, x i .
The receiver's type is normalized to 0. Assume players'preferences are Euclidean, so that a player with type x i prefers x to x 0 if and only if x is closer to x i than is x 0 . Preferences that 4 Other theories that assume Linear Outcomes use the functional form x = w + y. I prefer x = w y because (as we will see) it ensures that senders with higher types prefer to jam with higher messages. In substantive terms, w might be the adverse impact of climate change, while y is the costly abatement of this change.
Both functional forms satisfy the important property that x changes monotonically in w and y, and yield logically equivalent results.
satisfy these properties can be represented by a linear-loss utility function.
Single-Peaked Preferences A player with type x i has utility u (x i ; x) = jx i xj.
5
These two assumptions imply that for any w and y, a player with type x i has utility u (w; x i ; y) = jx i (w y)j. While the receiver may be thought of as preferring to learn the truth about w, senders may be thought of as preferring to in ‡uence public opinion.
Senders'types are common knowledge in most sender-receiver games. In contrast, assume that x i , the type of sender i, is the privately observed realization of a random variable with the distribution F i : Assume that F i is increasing on support X i with a hazard rate that increases in distance from 0. 6 The next assumption focuses attention on senders from opposing sides.
Opposing Senders For x 2 0;
Essentially, this assumption means that the receiver knows who prefers lower outcomes (sender 1) and who prefers higher outcomes (sender 2), but not who has preferences closer to her own. This assumption sets weak limits on the situations covered by this theory; for example, it excludes cases in which the senders may or may not be in opposition. But the range of political situations that can be described by these three assumptions remains vast.
Each sender i uses a message strategy m i (w; x i ). A message is essentially equivalent to both, "The value of w is m i ," and, "You should prefer the policy m i ." The receiver uses an opinion formation strategy y (m 1 ; m 2 ) and has beliefs given by a probability function h ( jm 1 ; m 2 ). In words, when the receiver observes messages m 1 and m 2 , she believes that w is w 0 with probability h (w 0 jm 1 ; m 2 ). The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian, which 5 The results hold for all symmetric, single-peaked functions, including quadratic-loss. 6 A distribution satis…es this property if the conditional density of x i given jx i j > x is always increasing in x > 0. Many distributions (e.g., uniform, truncated normal) have this property.
7 Since F i is monotone increasing in distance from 0,
F1(x) is decreasing and and m 1 = w otherwise, and sender 2 sends m 2 = 1 w for w 2 . If m 1 = m 2 , the receiver believes that w = m 1 = m 2 with probability 1. If m 1 = 1 m 2 , the receiver believes that w = m 1 with probability h (m 1 ) = 2x (m1 and that w = m 2 with probability h (m 2 ) = 1 h (m 1 ).
8
In this example, a sender jams when he sends 1 w rather than the truthful message w. For a pair of messages to emerge in equilibrium, senders must correctly evaluate the consequences their messages, and the receiver must behave as the senders conjecture she will.
In particular, the receiver must form the opinion y = 1 2 if she observes con ‡icting messages.
Since at least one sender always sends the truthful message, a jamming message must o¤set the impact of the truthful message on the receiver's beliefs. To see why the strategies and beliefs in the example constitute an equilibrium, consider each player's incentives.
First, the message strategies of senders re ‡ect incentives generated by the opinion formation strategy of the receiver. Sender 1, whose type is x 1 0, prefers to induce the receiver to choose y = , sender 1 prefers to reveal w.
Moreover, for each w 2 1 2 2x;
1 2 + 2x , it is possible that the other sender prefers to reveal w as well. As a consequence, it is always optimal for at least one sender to try to reveal w by sending a truthful message. The only potential downside of sending a truthful message is that the receiver might choose y = is the only opinion the receiver forms except for y = w, this downside is really no downside at all.
The consequence of these considerations is that the message strategies in the example are optimal, conditional on the receiver using the strategy speci…ed for her. Because the receiver has symmetric, single-peaked preferences, she maximizes her utility by choosing y equal to E (wjm 1 ; m 2 ), her expected value of w given the messages she received and her posterior beliefs given those messages. To understand why it is optimal for the receiver to use her speci…ed strategy, it is necessary to understand why she forms the beliefs she does.
It is straightforward to see why the receiver chooses y = m 1 = m 2 whenever she observes con…rmatory messages. Because the senders oppose each other, the only values of w on which they can agree are those that are su¢ ciently extreme for both to prefer y = w to y = 2x and sender 1 has a type x 1 very close to 0, then both senders prefer to send truthful messages.
In contrast, if the receiver observes messages m 1 and m 2 = 1 m 1 , she cannot infer who has been truthful and who has jammed. Instead, she forms beliefs using her information about the preferences of the senders and her conjectures about message strategies. From her perspective, the probability that, say, sender 1 has been truthful corresponds to the probability that sender 2 would want to jam m 1 . As determined above, this is the probability m 1 is in the interval
+ 2x 2 . Since x 2 is uniformly distributed, this probability is 1
. Similarly, the receiver believes that sender 2's message is truthful with the probability that m 2 is in In addition to being the probability with which the receiver believes the w is m 1 , h (m 1 ) is also the probability the receiver assigns to the event that sender 2 lied. Given h (m 1 ), the receiver also believes that w is m 2 with probability h (
These beliefs motivate the receiver to use the strategy speci…ed in the example. If the receiver observes messages m 1 and m 2 = 1 m 1 , she assigns probability h (m 1 ) to the event that w is m 1 and probability h (m 2 ) = 1 h (m 1 ) to the event that w is m 2 . Substituting in 10 To be more clear, since the receiver knows m 1 but is uncertain about x 2 , she believes that Pr m 1 1 m 1 for m 2 and 1 h (m 1 ) for h (m 2 ), and doing the algebra yields the expectation
which is precisely what is prescribed by her original strategy. This completes the explanation of why the strategies and beliefs in the example constitute an equilibrium.
The jamming message in the example may seem arbitrary, but it is actually tailored for this situation. A jamming message must be chosen so that, if it were truthful, the …rst sender might want to jam it, and would do so by using the truthful message that it is intended to jam. In the example, m J = 1 w has exactly that e¤ect. To see why, suppose sender 1 prefers to jam some w < . If w actually were m J , sender 2 could jam m J with the message w = 1 m J , which 2 sent in the …rst place.
In Figure 1 , which illustrates this example, the middle, "jamming" interval is indicated by the heavy black line on the horizontal axis. Truthful messages are represented by the lines with positive slope, while jamming messages are represented by the lines with negative slope.
All possible jamming messages that can be sustained in equilibrium are illustrated by the light gray line, although all jamming messages are not necessarily used in any given game.
Jamming is possible in the range corresponding to the two light gray triangles. The height of these triangles above any particular value of w indicates the amount of disagreement between jamming messages for that value of w. Which jamming messages are used depends on the type of each sender, which is the private information of that sender. This is illustrated in the …gure for x = ,and x 2 = 1 10
. Sender 1, whose messages appear as a solid line, sends jamming messages for w between , and sends truthful messages for all other w.
Before moving to more complete analysis of the model, several features of jamming are worth emphasizing. First, in related formal theories, truthful messages appear in separating equilibria, in which senders use di¤erent messages to distinguish between di¤erent values of policy-relevant information, w, and thereby reveal precise information to the receiver (e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989) . In the complementary pooling equilibria, senders select a single, constant, pooling message to send in each of a large range of values of w, thus preventing the receiver from learning which particular value in the pool is true. Jamming messages share similarities with each of theses other sorts of messages. Like truthful messages, jamming messages are not a constant function of w; instead, they change continuously. Like messages in pooling equilibria, jamming messages prevent the receiver from learning what is true, namely the information corresponding to the messages that jam each other.
Second, the receiver uses each sender's message to validate the other's. Information can only be credibly transmitted to the receiver if each sender con…rms the other's message. To see why, suppose there is a w in which sender 1 can credibly convey the value of w by himself, without con…rmation. If sender 1 does so, the receiver infers w and chooses y = w. But then sender 1 has the incentive to induce y = w by sending that message even when it is not. For example, if sender 1 has type x 1 , he can send the message when the true value is w + x 1 .
The receiver would still choose y = w, which is sender 1's ideal most preferred outcome.
Therefore, when sender 1 sends this message, the receiver has reason to suspect that w is false. Hence, sender 1 cannot credibly convey the value of w by himself; both senders must prefer to reveal the information if it is to be revealed at all. This sets the stage for jamming, since only one sender must object for the policy-relevant information to remain hidden.
Third, activities like elite discourse are seldom limited to two individuals, and the model should not be interpreted as requiring only one pair of identical messages among many more con ‡icting to yield policy change. Instead, the model sets limits on the ability of senders to mislead the receiver. Only consensus among senders can convince the receiver that a message is true. Consequently, a sender can cast doubt on a truthful message sent by his opponent by refusing to send a con…rmatory message.
Fourth, senders make dual allegations, one explicitly focused on policy-relevant information and the other implicitly asserting that anyone who says otherwise is lying. Jamming requires that, when senders'message con ‡ict, the receiver does not know who sent the jamming message. Thus, sending a jamming message is akin to alleging that the other sender is jamming and therefore has an extreme type. The dual nature of messages allows the receiver to use information about senders to inform her beliefs about policies.
Equilibrium Characterization
Although the above example illustrates many properties of jamming, a richer model allows for a more general equilibrium characterization and the derivation of empirical implications.
This section provides such an analysis in three steps. First, I formally de…ne what it means for a message to be jamming. Next, I present general strategies and beliefs that use jamming messages. Finally, I discuss the existence result that undergirds jamming equilibria.
The …rst task is to formally de…ne a jamming message. It is useful to contrast jamming messages with truthful messages, which convey information without distortion.
De…nition. For any w, the truthful message is simply w.
The truthful message is uniquely determined by w. The same is not obviously true for jamming messages. The latter sort is constrained by its principal use: jamming messages inhibit acceptance of truthful messages by leaving the receiver uncertain who has been truthful.
Therefore, each jamming message must satisfy a reciprocity condition. If the jamming message for w is m J , then w must be a jamming message in the counterfactual case that m J is actually truthful. This requirement is formalized in the following de…nition:
De…nition. A jamming function m J : W ! W is self-invertible, i.e., m J (m J (w)) = w for w 2 W . For any w 2 W , a jamming message is m J (w).
The jamming messages from the example are generated by a jamming function that satis…es this de…nition. In the example, the jamming function is m J (w) = 1 w. To verify that this is a jamming function, observe that m J (m J (w)) = 1 (1 w) = w. 
According to these strategies, jamming messages are sent only if w lies in the jamming interval W = (y d 2x; y d + 2x), but not necessarily for every w 2 W in any given game.
The incentives for senders to use jam depend on the receiver's response to jamming messages. This response is based on beliefs that in turn re ‡ect senders'message strategies.
Because jamming messages leave her uncertain who has been honest, she countenances two possibilities. First, 1's message may be truthful, in which case w is m 1 . Because 1 and 2 sent con ‡icting messages, this means that 2 must have preferred to jam. The indi¤erence cutpoint between truthtelling and jamming is 1 2 (m 1 y d ) . Thus, the receiver assigns the (conditional) probability that
(m 1 y d ) , to the event that 2 jammed. Using similar reasoning, the receiver assigns the (conditional) probability (y d m 2 ) to the event that 1 jammed. Bayes'rule yields the following beliefs:
The content of a jamming message-the value of m J (w) given w-knits together these strategies and beliefs into an equilibrium. That is, the strategies and beliefs in (2) and (3)
form an equilibrium if and only if the jamming messages senders use justify those strategies and beliefs. The crucial requirement is that y d must be the expected value of w given the posterior beliefs that follow jamming messages.
Equilibrium Proposition. Under general assumptions, a sender can …nd a message that will jam his opponent's. Thus, jamming messages in the above example are more than mere curiosity. Rather, in a very wide range of cases the receiver's ability to learn what she needs to know in order to become informed can be stymied by an informed, interested party.
Empirical Implications
Several empirical predictions can be drawn from this framework. A …rst question is when is jamming most likely, as a function of the policy-relevant information w senders observe. As w gets closer to the default opinion y d , more types of senders prefer to jam, and jamming therefore becomes more likely.
Moderate Information is More Likely to Be Jammed. If w < w 0 < y d or w > w 0 > y d , the probability of jamming is (weakly) larger for w 0 than for w.
There is almost always a di¤erence between y d and the true value of w. When the two are close, at least one sender is more likely to prefer to jam because the gains from biasing the receiver's beliefs in his favored direction outweigh the costs of preventing policy from responding to the state of the world. In the context of climate change, the skeptic tolerates small man-made changes in the environment and jams information that would cause unwelcome changes in opinion and might lead to policy changes. When calamitous changes are forecast, the skeptic is less apt to jam.
A second question is how jamming messages change as the policy-relevant information w changes. Returning to the example and to Figure 1 , as w increases away from y d = 1 2 , the jamming messages sent by sender 2 (represented by the dashed line) become more extreme in the opposite direction. This is a general feature of jamming.
Countervailing Jamming Messages. More extreme policy-relevant information must be jammed by more extreme jamming messages. That is, m J (w) decreases as w increases.
In the context of climate change, this would correspond to a skeptic claiming that sea levels rises are negligible when there are small increases and claiming that the sea levels are diminishing when there are larger increases. As policy-relevant information compels larger and larger shifts away from y d , jamming messages become more and more extreme in the opposite direction so as to o¤set the e¤ect of truthful messages. More dire warnings must be complemented with more strident defenses of their e¢ cacy because, in equilibrium, the receiver's expectation cannot change.
While the previous implications depend on objectively observing policy-relevant information, the following empirical implications consider messages and public opinion. Not all senders react in the same way to the same information. More extreme information leads senders with relatively moderate preferences to change their messages abruptly, depending on their types. That is, for each type of sender, there is a tipping point, a value of w at which he switches from sending a jamming message to a truthful one.
Senders Have Tipping Points. Each sender has a point at which more extreme information leads him to send truthful messages and less extreme information leads him to jam.
The prediction emphasizes the connection between information about policy and information about the preferences of senders. When there is disagreement in equilibrium, it is impossible for the receiver to extricate one from the other. A sender's tipping point is essentially his indi¤erence cutpoint between revealing the policy-relevant information and jamming. In , and will reveal all w less than this point. The next results focus on messages when one sender is more likely to be moderate than the other. Moderation is de…ned with respect to the receiver, so a more moderate sender is more likely than a more extreme sender to have preferences close to those of the receiver.
Such a sender might be seen as more moderate because of past actions or associations. The following de…nition formalizes this intuition:
De…nition. Sender i is more moderate (equivalently, less extremist) than sender j if, for any z > 0, Pr (jx i j < z) > Pr (jx j j < z). That is, i is more moderate if the probability that i's type is closer than z from the receiver's type, 0 , is greater than the probability that j's type is closer than z from 0.
More moderate senders are simply more likely to have preferences like the receiver than more extreme senders. Because the term is set in probability terms, it is still possible that a sender who is "more moderate," to actually have a privately known type that is further from the receiver. The de…nition is a variation on …rst order stochastic dominance from the literature on choice under uncertainty.
The more moderate sender always sends messages that appear to be more extreme, in the sense that they are further from the default y d .
Moderate Senders Send More Extreme Messages. If i is more moderate than j, i sends more extreme messages than j, and the receiver places more weight on j's messages.
This prediction re ‡ects the fact that the moderate sender is always less likely to jam than the extremist. Suppose sender 2 is more extreme and that he observes some w > y d that he prefers to jam. He knows his more moderate opponent, sender 1, will attempt to reveal w with m 1 = w. Consider what would happen if the 2 used the symmetric jamming message from above, m 2 = 2y d w, which is just as far from y d as w is. The probability the receiver assigns to a message from a sender is the probability that the other sender would want to jam it. Because 2 is more extreme, he is always more likely to jam, and so the receiver would assign a lower probability to m 2 than to m 1 . The receiver's optimal choice for y is her expectation of w, a weighted average of the messages she receives. Therefore, she would choose to shade y toward m 1 and away from m 2 and y d . But this cannot happen in equilibrium. Instead, sender 2 chooses a more moderate jamming message m J , one between the symmetric message m 2 and y d . Sending m J rather than m 2 pulls the receiver's opinion back to y d because the more moderate message is more likely to be jammed, which increases the weight the receiver places on 2's message. Figure 2 illustrates this prediction. In the …gure, sender 1 is more moderate than sender 2. The full extent of jamming messages is displayed, as though both senders were located at their most extreme types. Sender 1 always sends messages that appear to be more extreme than those sent by 2, regardless of who is telling the truth. Two examples are displayed.
First, if w < y d , sender 2 sends a truthful message (represented by the dashed diagonal line), and sender 2 sends a jamming message (represented by the solid, curvy line). The jamming message sent by 1 is further from y d than is the truthful message from 2. The corresponding w 0 > y d represents the counterfactual case in which 1's message is truthful and 2's is jamming. But these messages are the same as in the …rst case. Even though 1 is now telling the truth, she appears to be sending a more extreme message than 2.
A corollary is that as the preferences of the receiver change, the messaging behavior of senders also changes. Think of the receiver as the median member of the public. If the median's preferences change, for example, if she were to become more liberal, then she moves toward the sender on the left. This is akin to making the sender on the left more moderate relative to the public, and, consequently, leading that sender to issue more extreme messages, according to the previous result. The same logic can be applied to comparisons between public opinion in di¤erent constituencies or countries with the following prediction.
Audience Corollary. If the median member of audience A has an ideal point to the left of the median member of audience B, the sender on the left (respectively, right) sends more extreme (moderate) messages to A than to B.
Thus, the composition of the audience has an e¤ect on the strategic calculus of senders. This allows us to apply the logic of jamming to di¤erent states, countries, demographic groups, or issue publics-in short, any group that constitutes an audience to some set of senders. Upon re ‡ection, the Audience Corollary makes clear that, according to the jamming theory, elites and the public in ‡uence each other's behavior. foundations for the behavior of citizens or elites in his model; the former are assumed to be automatons, the latter reduced to information ‡ows. Jamming provides strategic underpinnings for this theory, substantiating Zaller's axioms using thinking, reasoning actors.
Discussion
At least three similarities emerge between Zaller's theory and jamming. First, equilibrium opinions in the jamming theory resemble Zaller's Response Axiom (p. 49), which states that citizens answer survey questions by averaging across available considerations. In jamming, the opinion of the receiver is a weighted average of elite messages. Furthermore, the two types of message pairs that appear in jamming equilibria (con…rming and con ‡icting) resemble
Zaller's one-message and two-message models, in which elites are exogenously assumed to send the relevant number of messages. Moreover, predictions about opinion in each case match equilibrium predictions of jamming. The "mainstream e¤ect" (p. 98) from the onemessage model resembles the full information opinion under con…rming messages, and the "polarization e¤ect" (p. 100) from his two-message model resembles the default opinion under con ‡icting messages. Unlike Zaller's theory, however, these features are not assumed; they are equilibrium implications of the micro-level assumptions of the jamming theory.
But jamming also complicates our understanding of public opinion and representation.
Consider whether elite actors persuade their constituents, or conform their actions to public opinion. Zaller (1992) and Lupia and McCubbins (1998) (1992) and Lupia and McCubbins (1998) to develop the hypothesis that elite policy positions shape public opinion on integration. Instead, he …nds strong support for the countervailing claim that elite messages follow public opinion. In the context of the jamming theory, given that di¤erent countries have audiences with di¤ering distributions of public opinion, the Audience Corollary implies that elites adapt their leadership strategies to the preferences of their audience. This more nuanced understanding of the elite-mass public relationship can also be subject to empirical examination. Moreover, these predictions and others that are less amenable to empirical test (like Countervailing Jamming Messages) can be tested experimentally. In the lab, subjects would play the roles of sender and receiver, and messages chosen for a variety of underlying information could be compared.
Outside of public opinion research, the theory adds to our understanding of the politics of expertise and lobbying. In Austen-Smith and Wright's (1992) theory, multiple interest groups are necessary to reveal the information policymakers need. These theories do not account for lobbyists who o¤er con ‡icting advice in order to stymie policy changes. In contrast, Esterling (2004) argues that complex issues lend themselves to arguments in which, "[b]oth sides of the debate make instrumental arguments (often, pro and con partial truths), so debate simply muddies the waters..., an uninformative pooling equilibrium"(p. 234), which is the goal of one side. His argument focuses on policy-relevant uncertainty, whereas the jamming theory highlights the role of preference uncertainty, and the conclusions di¤er in a subtle way. In the pooling equilibria Esterling has in mind, the receiver learns the same thing from messages sent in a large number of states. In contrast, when jamming occurs, the receiver learns that the state takes one of two values. Jamming is more informative than pooling, but not informative enough to reveal the true state of the world.
The jamming theory applies to institutions that divide informational labor among po- through sanctions by a monitoring public. These theories assume that the public monitors elite behavior probabilistically, in a non-competitive setting. Applying the jamming theory, opposed elites would be able to jam public monitoring, complicating the legitimacy problem faced by the judiciary. Because this would require additional assumptions, it would be best to begin such analysis with a simpli…ed example like the one presented above.
As it is, this theory is broadly applicable. But this basic model may be enriched to encompass even more political environments. First, both senders in this theory observe the policy-relevant information without error. Relaxing this assumption would admit a new dimension of strategic interaction, in which senders might seek to make correct predictions to prove their competence to the receiver. It would be valuable to analyze the tradeo¤s between this impulse and the incentive to a¤ect the receiver's action considered here. Second, the model presents a reduced-form account of how the public shapes policy. So long as elites care solely about aggregate public opinion, or so long as the median voter theorem applies (in which case the member of the public represents that voter), the model is su¢ ciently general to be applied without amendment. Nevertheless, for many other purposes it would be valuable to embed the jamming model in more complicated models of politics.
While the logic of jamming applies to many political environments, it is important to identify when it does not apply. Jamming requires at least two things to be true. First, receivers cannot become experts themselves, perhaps because it is too expensive or di¢ cult or because it requires an outlay of attention that is not rewarded su¢ ciently. If instead receivers could become informed, the potential for jamming would be limited. Second, receivers cannot participate in reasoned dialogue with senders. This means they cannot ask for rationales, or explore reasons for the contradictory messages senders o¤er. The combined force of these two "boundary conditions"makes clear that jamming is an unavoidable consequence of dividing informational labor in a democracy. Consequently, jamming can be mitigated by bridging this divide with institutions that help and encourage citizens to understand the reasons for policies, rather than just to rely on the opinions of experts.
Regardless of its applications, extensions, and potential for empirical tests, the …nal takeaway point from this research is that jamming provides counterintuition to the idea that competition leads to a more fully informed society (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1992) . According to the jamming theory, an increasingly competitive informational environment often provides more chances for jamming, rather than ideal conditions under which the truth will win out.
Additional informational providers are empowered to cast an e¤ective veto by disputing any information they prefer not to have communicated. In practice, the jamming mechanism is at work when voters are unable to screen signal from noise in elite messages, or when legislators, executives, justices, and regulators are confronted by contradictory information from opposing organized interests.
Appendix
I …rst state …ve lemmas, proofs of which can be found in the web appendix.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, the receiver believes that the state is w with probability 1 only if
If Opposing Senders is satis…ed, then it is possible in equilibrium for such con…rmatory messages to be su¢ cient for the receiver to maintain such a belief.
Lemma 2. If players use the strategies in (2), equation ( 
where h ( j ; ) represents the jamming beliefs given by (3). Suppose m 1 = m J (w), so that
, and (A2)
Algebraic manipulation of equation (A1) and the fact that h (m J (w) jw; m J (w)) = 1
Substitute (A2) and (A3) into (A4) and multiply by the common denominator to obtain
All jamming functions that are used in equilibrium must satisfy (A5). The next part of the proof constructs a jamming function m J ( ) that satis…es equations (4) and (3) from the text,
De…ne the functions 1 (m 1 ) : (y d ; y d + 2x) ! (0; x) as the right side of (A5) and 2 (m 2 ) :
as the left side of (A5), and consider two properties of 1 ( ) and 2 ( ).
(P1) Because
is increasing in x and
is decreasing in x, both 1 ( ) and 2 ( ) are concave and have unique maximizers, m 1 and m 2 respectively. (These maximizers solve
= 0, which are the virtual valuations familiar from auction theory.)
There are two cases to consider. 
To verify that m J (w) is a jamming function, note that it is self-invertible. For any w 2
The left side of (A5) is equal to 2 (w), and the right side is 1 (m J (w)). 
Applying an appropriate …xed point theorem (e.g., the Fan-Browder Theorem; Border, 1985) implies . Thus, following any o¤-the-path message pairs (m 1 ; m 2 ), the receiver prefers to choose y (m 1 ; m 2 ) = y d .
13
It remains to make certain there are no pro…table deviations from the proposed strategies.
First note that, if senders use the speci…ed message strategies, the receiver's beliefs are 13 Note that these beliefs match those used in Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) , rather than the beliefs presented by Krishna and Morgan (2001a) or in the one-dimensional model of Battaglini (2002) , that Battaglini and others argue are implausible.
formed using Bayes' Rule wherever possible, according to Lemmas 1 and 5. Her optimal opinion strategy is to set y (m 1 ; m 2 ) equal to her posterior expectation of w, which is either y (m 1 ; m 2 ) = m 1 if messages are con…rmatory or, by construction, y (m 1 ; m 2 ) = y d if they are con ‡icting. Now consider possible deviations by sender 1. Since the receiver only forms opinions y w and y d , senders are e¤ectively choosing between these two options. Lemma 3 indicates that senders'optimal message choices are exactly those speci…ed in (2).
The following results assume the existence of an equilibrium with a jamming function as given in the previous result. This jamming function has construction m J (w) = i ( i (w)),
where i 6 = j, and i; j 2 f1; 2g.
Countervailing Jamming Messages. Let m J : W ! W be a jamming function constructed via the method in the equilibrium proposition. Then m J ( ) is decreasing in w. 
It must be that .
